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1. About the Christian Paradigm
Miguel de Unamuno openly refused to conceive faith as a pre-
established belief in the unseen, a belief in that which could not
be seen. He rather comprehended it as a creation of what actually
(as a matter of fact and in actu) is being-unseen: “¿Creer lo que no
vimos? -asks himself rhetorically- ¡Creer lo que no vimos, no!, sino
crear lo que no vemos. Crear lo que no vemos, sí, crearlo, y vivir-





Kierkegaard presentó el concepto de autoridad en los
escritos que datan del final de su vida como contrapun-
to a la estrategia literaria desarrollada por medio de
pseudónimos varios para la promoción de un idea parti-
cular y espiritual de sujeto. Con el fin de comunicar
coherentemente esta noción (esto es, sin imponer un sen-
tido universal) hubo de reconocerse como autor “sin
autoridad” [uden Myndighed]. La apasionada ambigüe-
dad de este movimiento sería asumida décadas después
por Miguel de Unamuno, en quien halló póstumamente
uno de sus más fieles seguidores. Sintomáticamente, el
español solía referírsele como al “hermano Kierkega-
ard”; pues como él creó un peculiar corpus literario: com-
binando ficción y no ficción, concibió autores imagina-
rios, escribió novelas acerca de cómo escribir una novela
y plasmó pensamientos filosóficos a partir de la explo-
tación de sus recursos poéticos, completamente afectado
por una profunda inquietud religiosa.
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dolo otra vez, para otra vez crearlo… y así; en incesante tormento
vital”.1 It is by seizing the similarities of the Spanish terms creer (to
believe) and crear (to create), that Unamuno postulates the active,
passionate behaviour that shall be maintained for a spiritual com-
prehension. Pointed out first in “La fe”, an essay that dates from
1900, this precision would be reflected a decade later in his most
famous philosophical piece; the piece in which Søren
Kierkegaard's thought explicitly played a major role, namely Del
sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres (1911-1912).2 According
to Unamuno, religious belief does not consist in following abstract
dogmas, but in creating lively, once and once again, the hidden,
meaningful source. Creating that which we do not see, but never-
theless affects every day life in a concrete way; precisely, in the
need for a meaningful life.3
The religious attitude that connects human beings with tran-
scendence is, for Miguel de Unamuno, meant to be assured by
Christ's exemplary life. More than asking for the support of a series
of dogmas, the human face of the Trinity would encourage crea-
tures to action, to a daily creation. Thus understood, the paradigm
of imitatio transcends metaphysical theories and becomes, instead,
a practical, ethical explanation. If Christ represents, as it is stated
in the Gospel of John, the logos that turns the Creator's will com-
prehensible (inducing finally, by this same movement, the relief
for worldly sufferings) to believe means to re-create lively, not intel-
lectually, the meaning. In other words, to feel a responsibility in
relation to the very act of “meaning”. This common, English term
appears to be both ideal and actual; or, as Unamuno says about
faith, it works as an actual-ideal (“un ideal real”4): to mean is to say
1 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, “La fe”, Ensayos (Tomo II), Publicaciones de la residen-
cia de estudiantes, Madrid, 1916, p.221.
2 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres. Seguido
de Tratado del amor de Dios (ed. Nelson Orringer), Tecnos, Madrid, 2005, p.342; cfr.
p.301-302.
3 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, “La fe”, ed.cit., p.223. Unamuno insists upon the fact
that, from the Christian perspective, it is not necessary to attach to any ideology.
Even the ones that refuse the official belief may be close to the spiritual dimension:
“Tiénenla muchos que de él dicen renegar; descubriríanla a poco que se ahondasen.
Fe en Cristo, en la divinidad del hombre por Cristo revelada, en que somos, nos
movemos y vivimos en Dios; fe que no estriba en sus ideas, sino en él; no en una
doctrina que representara, sino en la persona histórica, en el espíritu que vivía y vivi-
ficaba y amaba. Las ideas no viven ni vivifican ni aman.”(Ibid., pp.228-229).
4 “La fe se alimenta del ideal y sólo del ideal, pero de un ideal real, concreto, viviente,
encarnado y a la vez inasequible” (v. UNAMUNO, Miguel de, “La fe”, ed.cit., pp.222-223).
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something, but then also to mean it, to support it with a specific,
appropriated attitude. It is from this openly existential perspective
that Kierkegaard emphasized, along his production (especially in
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the work that Unamuno
mainly refers to5), the need to conciliate theoretical and practical
possibilities. In his journal he stated it clearly: “the distinction -is
whether one speaks or whether one acts by speaking, whether one
uses the voice, facial expression (…) or whether one uses his life,
his existence”6. Before Unamuno's remarks, for which he would
become exemplary, Kierkegaard stuck to the latter. Evidence will
be provided in the following pages.
However, it is not the purpose of this essay to demonstrate, with
a series of uncountable, existing facts, Unamuno's relation to
Kierkegaard. This arduous task has been aimed in works like
Kierkegaard y Unamuno. La existencia religiosa, by Jesús-Antonio
Collado and, two decades later, in Unamuno: afinidades y coinciden-
cias kierkegaardianas, by Gemma Roberts. The former points out
similarities and differences in their respective concept of religion
and God; while the latter, being composed of three essays, rather
posits and develops the ideas in which both authors seem to agree,
following, thus, Martin Nozick's interpretation7. Valuable as they
indisputably are, and despite their significant differences, these
approaches assume naturally that there is some kind of spiritual or
ideological brotherhood, in tune with Unamuno's designation of
the Dane as his brother, el hermano Kierkegaard. It should be
noticed that there is no real difference in demonstrating the lim-
5 EVANS, Jan E., “Passion, Paradox, and Indirect Communication. The Influence
of 'Postscript' on Miguel de Unamuno”, en Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook 2005 (Cap-
pelørn, Niels Jørgen, Hermann Deuser & K. Brian Söderquist, eds.), Berlin/New York,
2005. pp. 137-152.
6 Papirer X-2 A466 (v. KIERKEGAARD, Søren, Journals and Papers, Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1967).
7 COLLADO, Jesús-Antonio, Kierkegaard y Unamuno. La existencia religiosa, Gredos,
Barcelona,1962; ROBERTS, Gemma, Unamuno: afinidades y coincidencias kierkegaardia-
nas, Society of Spanish and Spanish-American Studies, Boulder, 1986; NOZICK, Mar-
tin, Miguel de Unamuno, Twayne, New York, 1971. Deserve to be mentioned, as well,
the following articles: FASEL, Oscar A., “Observations on Unamuno and Kierkega-
ard”, Hispania, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Dec., 1955), pp. 443-450; BLANCO AGUINAGA, Car-
los, “Unamuno's Niebla: Existence and the Game of Fiction”, MLN, Vol. 79, No. 2,
Spanish Issue. (Mar., 1964), pp. 188-205; WEBBER, Ruth House, “Kierkegaard and the
Elaboration of Unamuno's Niebla”, Hispanic Review Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp.
118-134; EVANS, Jan E., “Passion, Paradox, and Indirect Communication. The
Influence of 'Postscript' on Miguel de Unamuno”, ed.cit.; EVANS, Jan E., “Kierkegaard,
Unamuno, and Don Quijote as the Knight of Faith”, Symposium, 60, 2006, p.3-16.
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its of this brotherhood or exploiting its most intense coincidences,
because both perspectives presuppose its existence. Furthermore,
one could ask whether it is possible or not to find a profound link
between them, and argue endlessly for its meaning. Instead of
amplifying the research in this direction, the present text rather
supports the thesis that what makes Unamuno a relative of
Kierkegaard are not the many readings of his works (that he effec-
tive possessed), but mainly his common need to find an appropri-
ated, meaningful language for the communication of authorial
inwardness in relation to his religious attitude. A kind of commu-
nication that, ambiguously enough -as we will illustrate-, is stated
as problematical in both their respective works since the very
establishment of its possibility, and that requires a complex, ficti-
tious device for its development. Conceived as the possibility of
being personally understood, this communication is to be found
originally in the core of Christian paradigm by means of the co-
action of logos and agape: logos, the redemptive incarnation of the
Father's will become comprehensible, and agape (lat. caritas), the
unconditioned, Christian work of love. 
The ambiguity of the religious movement that affects
Kierkegaard and Unamuno's production is not only justified by
the Christian idea that no action at all can be truly certified as a
charitable work, but also by the fact that there is not a pre-estab-
lished discourse, a referential logos that assures the presence of love
in the person that speaks. In the Gospel of Matthew (6:7) it is said
how useless, when praying, it is to use plenty of clever words. And
so Kierkegaard takes it literally: “There is no word, not one single
one, not the most sacred one, about which we were able to say: if
a person uses this word, it is unconditionally demonstrated that
there is love in that person”.8 An elevated or intellectual discourse
does not guarantee the adequacy of the speaker. Similar, in this
point, to the Kantian moral act, Kierkegaard¬ assumes that daily
experience cannot provide a decisive proof for its religious validi-
ty. It is important to emphasize how this ambiguity, dramatically
human, is related to divine authority: rather paradoxically -and
this is the “how”- the fulfilling of the major Christian command-
ment (you shall love your neighbour) cannot be demonstrated, nei-
ther by acts nor words.
8 v. KIERKEGAARD, Søren, Works of love, (Howard and Edna Hong, ed.), Prince-
ton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p.13.
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Cómo se hace una novela is the title of a late literary tour-de-force by
Miguel de Unamuno, achieved during his Parisian exile between
1924 and 1925. A novel in which he wrote, on the one hand, about
how a novel was to be written; and, on the other, attempted to
reveal, adopting a confessional tone, the tension between the cre-
ative act and its very meaning for the others, the readers. As it hap-
pens along Søren Kierkegaard's treatment of his authorship, especial-
ly with the elucidation of the meaning of his authorial duty, in Cómo
se hace una novela the topic of authority is problematized, ambigu-
ously understood from the Christian perspective that relates logos
and agape. Unamuno refers to the famous passage of the Bible where
a woman who committed adultery is about to be stoned, in applica-
tion of the Law of Moses (John 8:1-11). Jesus is then asked for his
opinion by the accusers, which actually want to trap him. But
instead of answering back, instead of explaining what he thinks with
human words (words that could be legally confounded), he keeps
quiet: seeming to be lost in thought, he merely writes something on
the ground's dust. “Something” easily illegible, because, what kind of
support is dust? Is it authoritarian enough? We can hardly imagine a
better counter-example of Moses Stone-Tablets. The form of the com-
mandment is, as Paul of Tarsus insisted on while his spreading task
of Christendom, transformed by an internalized interpretation
which is more existential than intellectual or legal; an interpretation
that erases the limits, the criterions for the strict application of the
law, but at the same time involves every single person, guilty or not.
Thus, Jesus does not say explicitly what should be done in the case
of the adulteress, but rather advices with an empty statement (“if any
one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her”,
John 8:7). Unamuno underlines the difficulty of this, his lecture; and
deduces the appropriate-though-undeterminable attitude to follow:
“¿Qué leyeron en el polvo sobre el que escribió el Maestro? ¿Leyeron
algo? ¿Se detuvieron en aquella lectura? Yo, por mi parte, me voy por
los caminos del campo y de la ciudad, de la naturaleza y de la histo-
ria, tratando de leer, para comentarlo, lo que el invisible dedo de Dios
ha escrito en el polvo”.9 This invisible finger of God points the possi-
bility of a reading, but does not lecture, does not establish clear com-
mandments for men's behaviour. All the responsibility is left to the
one who assumes the task of a become-ethical, personal comprehen-
sion. 
9 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, Cómo se hace una novela, Guadarrama, Madrid, 1977,
p.49.
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Such an understanding involves, at the same time, the logos, the
comprehensive action of Christ's existence through the abasement of
the Father. In his comment on the biblical passage of the adulteress,
Unamuno specifies it: “Y Dios al escribirlo se doblega a tierra. Y lo
que Dios ha escrito es nuestro propio milagro, el milagro de cada uno
de nosotros, San Agustín, Juan Jacobo, Juan Cassou, tú, lector, o yo
que escribo con pluma y tinta este comentario, el milagro de nuestra
conciencia de la soledad y de la eternidad humana”.10 The movement
of Christian paradigm, that both Unamuno and Kierkegaard recreate,
may be thus understood from the perspective of ambiguity: it offers
to the self, that inner person postulated first by Augustine of Hippo
(later on would be conceived in secular terms as subjectivity or con-
science), the lofty possibility to understand, to create its proper
meaning; but at the same time leaves it in a tragic, unreachable lone-
liness. The transcendental power, the Creator, abases Himself in the
person of Christ, whose sacrifice gives a tool for mankind's compre-
hension. “On his writing, God bends to the ground”, stated -see the
quote above- Unamuno. The “miracle” that represents the loving
incarnation of God, the logos, remains ambiguous; because together
with the possibility of a meaningful comprehension of one's self, it
is simultaneously given the most frightful one: the absolute incom-
prehension from the world, la soledad, tragic, individual fate that the
Spaniard refers to in the quote above (see, also, Del sentimiento trági-
co de la vida en los hombres), and that was originally experienced by
Christ himself, when crucified. This lonesome suffering, depicted by
Slavoj Zizek in a deeply theological work11, allows the religious move-
ment, the transcendence of the creatures' finitude, related in this
manner to the creator. The words “My God, My God, why have you
forsaken me?" (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34) show Christ's most
human side: conscious of the paradoxical, almost absurd incapacity
of his discourse (i.e., the need for a comforting explanation), seems
to regret his insufficient condition as logos to the creator of logic12,
the creator of an a priori meaningful cosmos. Paradox does not come
only from the idea of a Death of God, but from the fact that this self-
understanding paradigm, distinctively Christian, takes place thanks
10 Id.
11 ZIZEK, Slavoj, El títere y el enano. El núcleo perverso del cristianismo, Paidós, Bue-
nos Aires, 2005.
12 Gordon Clark, philosopher and Calvinist theologian, went as far as to transla-
te Logos for "Logic" in the opening verses of the Gospel of John: "In the beginning
was the Logic, and the Logic was with God and the Logic was God" (v. CLARK, Gor-
don H., The Johannine Logos, Trinity Foundation, Jefferson, MD, 1972).
JACOBO ZABALO ARS BREVIS 2007
182
to the impossibility of being understood by those others with whom
it is actually shared the capability of understanding. A private dimen-
sion grows inside each individual, legitimated by the godly dialectic
that authorizes inwardness; and, nevertheless, together with it grows
the possibility of not having it recognized, in its specificity, by the
impersonal mass. Through logos takes place the internalization of
God's authority, according to Paul of Tarsus' message; but, as hap-
pened to Christ, the paradigmatic logos, authority can neither be
imposed nor clearly exposed to the others. It is ambiguous (just as
the work of love described with the parable of left hand's ignorance
for what the right one does, in Matthew 6:3), and therefore needs -
in Kierkegaard's words- to remain incognito, in spite of all the suffer-
ing.
2. The Problem of Communication
The peculiar ambiguity lying under the concept of authority is
revealed in Kierkegaard's reflections about his literary, educative
purpose; or, paraphrasing one of his late, auto-referential and bio-
graphical books, about that work as an author, which he precisely
pretended to support “without authority” [uden Myndighed]. The
confusion of literary authorship and religious authority appears
clearer than everywhere else in the following quotation from his
journal: “I as an author am a penitent, but if I let men perceive
this, I would eo ipso not be a penitent, then they perhaps might
even esteem me, that is, I would win them over directly, that is, I
would deceive them”13. Assuming his condition as a mere author,
he chooses to decline authority, thanks in part to what he calls
“indirect communication” [indirecte Meddelelse]. But still, this dis-
guised movement implies an authoritarian behaviour towards the
others, who supposedly need to be relieved by a positive decep-
13 Papirer IX A150 (v. KIERKEGAARD, Søren, Journals and Papers, Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1967).
14 Joakim Garff has pointed out some of the problems underlying Kierkegaard's
late explanation about his literary purpose: “The desire to construct the self narrati-
vely or 'subjunctively' implies a destruction of the empirical or 'indicative' self,
which, in a double sense, gives the bio-graphy the character of the deconstruction
of the self. These are the terms of his bio-graphy, which renders impossible any final
question of where (and when) Kierkegaard is a deceiver in his text and where (and
when) the text deceives Kierkegaard” (v. GARFF, Joakim, “The Eyes of Argus. The
point of View and Points of View with Respect to Kierkegaard´s 'Activity as an Aut-
hor'”, Kierkegaardiana 15, C.A. Reitzel, Copenhague, 1991, p.43).
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tion; a deception that, recalling Socrates method, Kierkegaard
would go so far as to call it deception unto the truth.14
Kierkegaard and Unamuno, religious writers both of them, expe-
rience the Christian universal-specificity in the very moment of
creating a discourse about themselves for those others, the readers,
capable also of self-understanding: “on the whole -writes
Kierkegaard- one person can never understand another person
altogether privately. Every third party (and that, after all, is what
one person is always in relation to another) always understands
the communication somewhat more universally”15. And Unamuno
gives an almost identical reply: “No, no comunica uno lo que
quería comunicar; apenas un pensamiento encarna en palabra, y
así revestido sale al mundo, es de otro, o más bien no es de nadie
por ser de todos. La carne de que se reviste el lenguaje es comunal
y es externa; engurruñe al pensamiento, lo aprisiona y aun lo
trastorna y contrahace”16. Unamuno just like Kierkegaard (if that
individualistic reading could actually be shared, understood from
a common perspective!) understands that language's incarnation
adulterates somehow its very essence: its inward foundation is dis-
torted when put outward. 
Broken thus the linguistic link, the spiritual inwardness that
both authors agree to conceive implies a detachment from the rest
of selves, which happen then to be considered as mere objects,
devaluated by the proper, individual existence. Before the so-
called existentialisms, we find this same perspective already in
Kierkegaard's thought, which locates them under the impersonal
label of “the mass” [Maengden]. The Dane takes account of the mis-
understanding of his contemporary fellows, long before Martin
Heidegger's existential hermeneutics, and thus describes the
improper way of understanding: “The multitude, the crowd, all
agree, so they think, in thousands; they understand one another
entirely in thousands. The better philosophers, however, know
that there have never lived two persons who have completely
understood each other”17. And, again, Unamuno (whose work
seems to be predicted in Kierkegaard's preference for some philoso-
phers) writes consequently about his need to escape the crowd:
15 KIERKEGAARD, Søren, The book on Adler (Howard and Edna Hong, ed.), Prin-
ceton University Press, Princeton, 1998, p.92. 
16 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, “Intelectualidad y espiritualidad”, en Ensayos (Tomo
IV), Publicaciones de la residencia de estudiantes, Madrid, 1917, pp.198-199.
17 KIERKEGAARD, Søren, The book on Adler, ed.cit., p.92. 
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“Mi amor a la muchedumbre es lo que me lleva a huir de ella. Al
huirla, la voy buscando” and, a little further, “Sólo la soledad nos
derrite esa espesa capa de pudor que nos aísla a los unos de los
otros; sólo en la soledad nos encontramos; y al encontrarnos,
encontramos en nosotros a todos nuestros hermanos en
soledad”18. This individual state of being (la soledad), understood
by Unamuno as the most personal and common fate, can be trans-
lated both by the melancholic affection that is implied, as “loneli-
ness”, and by the factual separation from the rest of selves, the
“solitude” that reveals a longing, and together with it a common
human origin, a mutual belonging.
As an application of the Christian paradigm, it seems to take
place, for the foundation of the existential inwardness that we
find both in Kierkegaard and Unamuno, a movement of this kind:
I am (more) myself when I am not mixed with the others, and being
more myself I get to love better those who are not themselves, who are
just “others” for themselves, as much as they are for me. Love for the
neighbour is, in these terms, unequivocally ambiguous: because, if
I really believe that he or she is just like me, why do I run away, look-
ing for my specificity? The fact is that the distinction of a personal
“I” from the mass (authorized without daring to think who is the
impersonal mass, acknowledging precisely its lack of who) estab-
lishes a criterion for the validity of the self's thought and action.
Abraham's leap, taken from the book of Genesis, is one of the most
meaningful examples for Kierkegaard, who developed it in his well
known Fear and Trembling. Beyond any external determination,
being impossible to comprehend by means of an objective, uni-
versally valid language, the model of subjectivity that represents
Kierkegaard's Abraham authorizes itself in front of the Absolute,
which validates the peripety. The meaning of it all, revealed in this
explicitly religious example by God, paradigmatic authority, goes
on to that individual [Den Enkelte]. Spiritually affected, discovers
in his inner core a most extreme and unreachable principle of real-
ity, a principle -we already mentioned it- that cannot be under-
stood from the outside. The certainty of the proper deed is accom-
18 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, “Soledad”, en Ensayos (Tomo VI), Publicaciones de la
residencia de estudiantes, Madrid, 1918, pp. 42-3. The following quotation explicitly
connects him with Augustinian inwardness: “Sólo en la soledad, rota por ella la espe-
sa costra del pudor que nos separa a los unos de los otros y de Dios a todos, no tene-
mos secretos para Dios; sólo en la soledad alzamos nuestro Corazón al centro del
Universo; sólo en la soledad brota de nuestra alma el himno redentor de la confe-
sión suprema” (Ibid., p.43).
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panied by the impossibility of communicating it. Kierkegaard
develops this idea in the last problem of the three that compose
Fear and Trembling, dedicated precisely to the impossible explana-
tion of Abraham's silence. Should have told his wife and son about
the sacrifice God asked him for? But, could he really speak with-
out being misunderstood?19
This same procedure (the religious foundation of subjectivity)
was critically reported by Theodor W. Adorno in his early disser-
tation on Kierkegaard: “the ego, shelter of everything which is
concrete, is contracted in its singularity in a way that nothing can
be said of it: it becomes the maximum abstraction; to say that only
the individual knows what the individual is, it is nothing but a
paraphrase of the fact that nothing from the individual can be
known; thus, the most determined I is at the same time the most
undetermined I20. In its enigmatic essence, the kierkegaardian sub-
jectivity, described as “mythical and ambiguous”, produces the
meaning of actuality in an immanent, god-like (and thus, tran-
scendental) movement; but, at the same time, detects the false-
hood of its reflections, which turn meaningless when shared with
other egos21. Jesús-Antonio Collado agreed to allude, in his book
about Unamuno's relations to Kierkegaard, to the extraordinary
emphasis placed by both thinkers on the category of subjectivity,
which is even regarded as a “capital vice”22. 
To conclude this section, it is necessary to underline that Una-
muno's relations to Kierkegaard are not due to any ideological rea-
son, but quite the opposite; i.e., because of the common belief of
its lack, according to the religious, Christian paradigm. A belief
translated by the subjective reading that enables by the responsi-
bility (¿the authority?) implicit in the posited, untransferable
interpretation. Just like Kierkegaard, Unamuno does not believe in
the communication of an objective, shareable truth, but rather
19 Of course, Kierkegaard's reading of the Old Testament is a Christian one, from
the perspective of the powerful, authoritarian ambiguity of logos. Derrida makes this
point clear in Donner la mort (v. DERRIDA, Jacques, Dar la muerte, Paidós, Barcelona,
2006).
20 ADORNO, Theodor W., Kierkegaard. Construcción de lo estético, Akal, Madrid,
2006, p.98
21 Ibid., p.105.
22 COLLADO, Jesús-Antonio, op.cit., p.488 (“Ciertamente, podría decirse que éste
es el vicio capital de Kierkegaard: una subjetividad exacerbada; como lo es también
el de Unamuno, quien, por otra parte, posee un sentido de lo social que en vano se
buscará en Kierkegaard”).
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recognizes it to exist exclusively and personally involved in the
very act of creation. An act that separates them from that mass of
readers for whom they actually create, while they become more
and more aware of their inward, unreachable dimension. The fed-
back tension between ambiguity and authority, present through-
out Kierkegaard and Unamuno's authorship, was also reflected by
a well-known intermediate contemporary of them, Friedrich Niet-
zsche, who wrote: “Posthumous men -me, for example- are under-
stood worse than the current, but better paid attention to. More pre-
cisely, we are never understood -and hence our authority”.23
3. Creators and Creatures 
The overvaluation of subjectivity, obvious in Kierkegaard's posi-
tion against Hegel and developed in the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, the work Unamuno quoted most, goes along with the
crisis of language's objectivity, which is considered thus as an
impersonal-though-necessary medium for communication. In
Kierkegaard's production, poetical resources, frequently attributed
to pseudonymous authorities, are meant to solve precisely this
problem. At this point takes place the -above mentioned- confu-
sion between human authorship and divine authority. The Dane
admits in his personal journal: “the fact that there is a pseudonym
is the qualitative expression that it is a poet-communication, that
is not I who speaks but another, that it is addressed to me as much
as to others”24. Assigning discourses to several pseudonyms,
Kierkegaard pretends to be able to communicate thoughts,
thoughts that actually are not his, but rather the non-authorized
product of another author's imagination. Here again we confront
an astonishing ambiguity, which was reflected, amongst other
commentators, by Adorno25. Certainly, it is not proper to ascribe
23 “Posthume Menschen -ich sum Beispiel- werden schlechter verstanden als zeit-
gemässe, aber besser g e h ö r t. Strenger: wir werden nie verstanden -und d a h e r-
unsre Autorität…” (v. NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, KSA 6, Götzen-Dämmerung, DTV/ Wal-
ter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1988, p.61).
24 Papirer X-2 A184 (v. KIERKEGAARD, Søren, Journals and Papers, ed.cit.). Close in
spirit to Kierkegaard, Unamuno's passionate words say much about his problemati-
cal duty as a lyrical writer: “Es, en efecto, cosa terrible tener que escribir cuando se
siente uno dominado por una potencia lírica, cuando la intimidad le rebosa, cuan-
do no son noticias ni ideas o frases repetibles lo que se quiere decir, sino íntimas pre-
ocupaciones personales, de esas que por ser de cada uno lo son de todos” (UNAMU-
NO, Miguel de, “Desahogo lírico”, en Soliloquios y conversaciones, Espasa-Calpe, Bue-
nos Aires, 1942, p.54)
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directly the contents of the pseudonym pieces to the one that
decides to use the equivocal medium of pseudonymity. This medi-
um represents the acknowledgement of the fact that he is not the
owner of the truth, but just a self capable of conceiving it, of pro-
moting this same conception into the others, those readers whom
-perhaps not so humble- Kierkegaard needs to consider not
enough subjective: “One of the tragedies of the modern times is
precisely this -to have abolished the I, the personal I (…) I regard
it as my service that by bringing poetized personalities who say I
(my pseudonyms) into the centre of life's actuality, I have con-
tributed, if possible, to familiarizing the contemporary age again
to hearing an I, a personal I speak”26. What is, then, Kierkegaard's
relation to the fictitious, pseudonymous selves? Even if he claimed
to be a mere observer, external to the aesthetical writing, pseudo-
nymous works like Fear and Trembling ¬say much about his exis-
tence. Obviously, this opinion does not correspond either to a per-
sonal belief or a partial reading. He, himself, would consider ret-
rospectively those works as causing his personal upbringing.27
The problem that Kierkegaard faces by means of this strategy has
been already outlined from the spirituality that supports his
thought. As a true, radical problem, it cannot be solved, but rather
studied in depth, progressively. Kierkegaard recognizes his task as
author only “without authority” [uden Myndighed], which seems to
be a clear paradox. Clearly paradoxical, but also utterly coherent
according to the Christian paradigm, to the ambiguity that affects
25 ADORNO, Theodor W., Kierkegaard. Construcción de lo estético, ed.cit., p.11
(“Respecto a la reivindicación poética, la obra de Kierkegaard es ambigua. Malicio-
samente se presta a todo malentendido que inicie en el lector un proceso de apro-
piación de sus contenidos. La dialéctica en las cosas es para Kierkegaard a la vez dia-
léctica de la comunicación. En ésta, la obra reivindica engañosamente el título de lo
poético para luego negarlo”).
26 The complete, meaningful passage: “One of the tragedies of the modern times
is precisely this -to have abolished the I, the personal I. For this very reason ethical-
religious communication is as if vanished from the world. For ethical-religious truth
is related essentially to personality and can only be communicated by an I to an I.
As soon as the communication becomes objective in this realm, the truth has beco-
me untruth. Personality is what we need. Therefore I regard it as my service that by
bringing poetized personalities who say I (my pseudonyms) into the center of life´s
actuality, I have contributed, if possible, to familiarizing the contemporary age again
to hearing an I, a personal I speak” (Papirer VIII-2 B88; cfr. Pap. X-1 A531; v. op.cit.).
27 “For me indirect communication has been instinctive within me, because in
being an author I no doubt have also developed myself, and consequently the whole
movement is backward, which is why from the beginning I could not state my plan
directly, although I certainly was aware that a lot was fermenting within me.” (Pap.
X3 A413).
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its origin; that is, the impossibility of being understood in the very
act of understanding by love to the transcendental, by a secret
identification with the authority. We have previously mentioned
Abraham's sacrifice, an act that is commented in terms of undecid-
ability by Jacques Derrida in The Gift of Death.28 As Herman
Melville's Bartleby, the creature that Kierkegaard re-creates in his
fiction and names “Abraham” (but, couldn't also be called
“Søren”?) cannot speak. Actually, he definitely would prefer not to
kill what he loved most in the world (in Kierkegaard's biography:
not to leave Regina, his fiancée), but feeling chosen by the ulti-
mate, heavenly creator, he had to do so. The creature that appro-
priates the creator's authority, in a movement that Kierkegaard can
only describe as absurd, represents a scandal for the society, but
also for himself. Kierkegaard's claims (who especially by the end of
his life, seizing the religious meaning of his work as an author,
refused both religious authority and the exploitation of poetical
resources) have to be understood in that sense. Undoubtedly, they
appear not only paradoxical, but also pathetic: it is precisely by
assuming a lack of legitimacy that he authorizes himself, so to
accuse those who supposedly are not enough personal. In a rather
authoritarian manner, Kierkegaard takes advantage of the obliged
misunderstanding of his authorial task and sits close to the reli-
gious. In the name of something impossible to name, the
kierkegaardian self appears above the rest of non-existing selves, in
other words, the mass of mere readers. 
Miguel de Unamuno, by his side, believed so deeply in the
power of literary creation that he even compared it with God's.
It should be noted that the extraordinary, self-conscious treat-
ment of his production makes explicit what the kierkegaardian
model implies, but whose consequences Kierkegaard does not
always assume. Namely, that the author, the one who appears to
be unequivocally authorized, becomes, by the same exclusive,
transcendental leap, an isolated and meaningless being; in other
words, an ambiguous focus of meaning. The consequences of
this openly existential perspective are, in both cases, similar. If
Kierkegaard, who claimed to be a unique self and promoted in
the others their true “I”, suffers by the end of his life from his
fate, believing -perhaps needing to believe- that he has become
in his contemporaries eyes' an overly dramatic caricature, Una-
28 v. DERRIDA, Jacques, Dar la muerte, Paidós, Barcelona, 2006, pp.86-9.
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muno recognizes -what could be called, after Cervantes' novel-
the quixotism of his existence: he, the creator, has turned into a
creature.29 He is not anymore the one who decides but, existing
for himself also in third person, is decided by others, the readers;
the ones who shall fix posthumously the effective transcen-
dence of his authority, who shall bring life to his effective
death.30
This dialectic, exemplary found in the second part of El Quijote,
is revealed by Unamuno in Niebla at the precise moment when the
main character, named Augusto, visits the author of it (“Miguel de
Unamuno”), who immediately becomes, at the readers' eyes, a fic-
titious being. The author that is supposed to decide over his crea-
tures' life and death admits ironically to be trapped by his own cre-
ation: he lets the creature, his creature, tell him that he is just a
reader, a creature himself with the capacity of creating… but sure-
ly, also, with the possibility of being misunderstood, deceived by
his own idea of reality. “No se incomode tanto -argues Augusto,
Unamuno's character- si yo a mi vez dudo de la existencia de usted
y no de la mía propia. Vamos a cuentas: ¿no ha sido usted el que
no una sino varias veces ha dicho que Don Quijote y Sancho son
no ya tan reales, sino más reales que Cervantes?”31. This ambigu-
ous statement admits absolutely no reply. The creature accuses the
creator through his own creation, erases the distinction between
reality and fiction. This does not only represent a novelistic idea,
explicitly related to Cervantes' major work; because Unamuno
truly believes in the undecidability (the impossibility of reaching an
elucidation) of his creation. He assumes that his daily task, what
brings meaning to his life, is also what makes him unreachable, for
himself as well. In his theory about the novel (his novel about a
possible theory of the creative act, entitled Cómo se hace una nov-
ela) he concludes -back to the reflections on faith with which this
29 Cfr. EVANS, Jan E., “Don Quijote, Kierkegaard, Unamuno, and Don Quijote as
the Knight of Faith”, ed.cit. This article does not develop the fictional devices that
are being exposed in this section, but rather studies the adequacy of Unamuno's
understanding of Cervantes' character as a representative of Kierkegaard's category
of the religious individual depicted in Fear and Trembling.
30 “Nuestro señor Don Quijote se ensimismó tanto en sus lecturas de los libros de
caballerías que acabó 'asimismándose', o sea atribuyéndose a sí mismo las proezas
que allí leía. Y por este camino llegó a enajenarse, a entregarse a los demás, y bus-
cándose a sí propio darse por entero en holocausto a los otros” (UNAMUNO, Miguel
de, “¡Ensimísmate! Una vez más”, in Monodiálogos, Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1972,
p.21).
31 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, Niebla, Espasa, Buenos Aires, 1942, p.172.
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essay began- by relating creation, literary authorship, to a kind of
religious belief: “este Unamuno me da vida y muerte, me crea y me
destruye, me sostiene y me ahoga. Es mi agonía. ¿Seré como me
creo o como se me cree? Y he aquí cómo estas líneas se convierten
en una confesión ante mi yo desconocido e inconocible; descono-
cido he inconocible para mí mismo. He aquí que hago la leyenda
en la que he de enterrarme”32. 
Shall I be as I believe I am, or as I am believed to be (“como se me
cree”)? Unamuno's desperate and ambivalent question can also be
translated from the original language thus: Shall I be as I create
myself (“como me creo”), or as I am believed to be… as a creator?
What is clear is that the “legend” Miguel de Unamuno alludes to,
his existence as an ambiguously authorized author, led him to the
confession of a final, almost posthumous confusion. Something
similar had happened decades before to his beloved, spiritual
brother, Søren Kierkegaard, who experienced the need to write a
final and true explanation of his authorship. An explanation pro-
jected, after many doubts, to be published posthumously with the
(not ambiguous at all, but rather authoritarian) title: The Point of
View for my Work as an Author. In spite of the absolute authority of
death, most unambiguous medium of all, it has survived the prob-
lem of his authorship's meaning (a living proof: the uncountable
existing bibliography on this purpose). And, although
Kierkegaard's attempt to categorize explicitly, in the posthumous
text, his poetical production under the idea of “ambiguity” [Tvety-
digheden]33, the clue of it remains secretly hidden, as a consequence
of the ideal of subjectivity legitimated by means of an ambiguous,
lifelong melancholic isolation. “A secret always provokes trem-
bling”, wrote Derrida34, who believed also that sharing it with oth-
ers did not imply an elucidation, but rather the opposite. Perhaps
this is the reason why Kierkegaard's unsolved and problematic
32 UNAMUNO, Miguel de, Cómo se hace una novela, ed.cit., p.66 (cfr., p.80).
33 The objectiveness of a concept like “ambiguity” is hardly to believe, especially
when the one who argues in favour has done everything along his lifetime to esca-
pe from philosophical speculations of this kind. Certainly, the control over the rest
of the entire production (whose texts, as Joakim Garff has explained, would like to
“over-write”) is, in The Point of View, dramatic (v. GARFF, Joakim, “The Eyes of
Argus. The point of View and Points of View with Respect to Kierkegaard´s 'Activity
as an Author'”, ed.cit., p.36). The indirect way of communicating, the poetic dis-
course in which Kierkegaard often assumes to be trapped (Pap. X-2 A106; 83; Cfr.
Pap. Pap. X-1 A78; 63 and X-1 A510; 329) appears to be, when directly, unequivo-
cally confessed, at its maximum equivocalness.
34 DERRIDA, Jacques, op.cit., p.65 (cfr. p.92).
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issue keeps on appearing meaningful and suggestive. Actually,
who can decide the meaning that energetically refuses to mean
something? And -what seems even more troubling- is it possible
not to get involved, from the perspective of the existing beings
that we are meant to be, as readers, in such an undecidable, ficti-
tious and yet real quest? 
Abstract
The concept of authority was introduced in Søren Kierkegaard's
writings by the end of his lifetime as a counterpoint to his literary
strategy, developed by means of several pseudonyms, to promote
the idea of a particular, spiritual self. In order to communicate
coherently this notion, i.e. without imposing a universal meaning,
he had to recognize himself as an author “without authority”
[uden Myndighed]. The passionate ambiguity of this movement
would be assumed some decades later by Miguel de Unamuno, in
whom he posthumously found one of the most faithful followers.
Symptomatically enough, the Spaniard used to call him “Brother
Kierkegaard” [el hermano Kierkegaard]. Like him, he created a
peculiar literary corpus: combining fiction and non-fiction, he
conceived imaginary authors, wrote novels about how to write a
novel, and captured philosophical thoughts supported by his
poetical resources, affected altogether by a profound religious
concern.
